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I. INTRODUCTION  
Information is the currency of victory on the 
Battlefield.  
General Gordon Sullivan 
Former Army Chief of Staff 
 
A. AREA OF RESEARCH  
This thesis will address the planned configuration of 
Lockheed Martin’s Flight Zero, Module Spiral Alpha Littoral 
Combat Ship (LCS) and the ongoing development of the 
SPARTAN SCOUT, one of the Navy’s Unmanned Surface Vessels 
(USV).  Technology currently available as well as 
developmental technologies will be recommended for 
implementation in order to make the LCS and SCOUT assets to 
Information Operations (IO) objectives.   This thesis will 
include an evaluation of the current policy for authorizing 
Information Operations missions, specifically in the areas 
of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Electronic Warfare 
(EW).  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To what degree, if any, can the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) effectively become an asset to Information 
Operations? To what degree, if any, does the inclusion of 
the LCS’ employment of the SPARTAN SCOUT (USV) affect the 
LCS’ ability to support IO missions?  
In conducting this analysis, this thesis will address 
the following questions: 
1. How are the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT currently 
configured in support of IO missions? 
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2. Could each be reconfigured in order to support 
additional IO missions? 
3. Should either be reconfigured in order to support 
IO missions based on cost versus perceived 
benefits? 
4. If the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT could be used for IO 
are there existing assets that could provide 
better IO coverage? 
5. If the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT could be assets to 
IO objective how would current IO doctrine (i.e. 
approval process) need to change? 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
According to the Joint Information Operations Planning 
Handbook, “IO involves actions taken to affect adversary 
information and information systems while defending ones 
own information and information systems.”1 There is little 
argument that in recent conflicts there has been more 
emphasis placed on Information Operations and in turn, 
Information Warfare.  In Operations DESERT SHIELD and 
DESERT STORM in 1991 the Joint Force Commanders 
Psychological Operations campaign proved most effective in 
convincing a very large number of Iraqi solders to 
surrender without a fight.  
As the future of IO is conceptualized on the premise 
that modern and emerging technologies, particularly 
information specific advances, will make possible a new 
level of joint operations capability, it is only 
appropriate to evaluate the latest class of naval ships and 
the latest progress in USV development.2  This point is 
                     
1 CJCS. Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), I-1. 
2 CJCS. Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), I-7 
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further illustrated by the Joint IO Planning Handbook which 
states, “Underlying a variety of technological innovations 
is information superiority – the capability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of 
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s 
ability to do the same.”3  The LCS is in development with 
Lockheed Martin’s (LM) flight zero scheduled to begin sea 
trials in December of 2006. The SPARTAN SCOUT is also in 
development having just completed its Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstration (ACTD), under the direction of the 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Newport. As both 
the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT are in the development phase, a 
review of currently planned IO configurations and 
recommendation for future IO module development is entirely 
appropriate at this time. 
This thesis will evaluate whether the LCS could be 
configured to conduct Information Operations.  It will 
evaluate the complexity of the configuration as compared to 
the potential IO benefits.  This evaluation will suggest 
whether or not the LCS should become an asset configured to 
accomplish IO objectives.   Following the evaluation of the 
organic components of the LCS, we will conduct a similar 
evaluation of adapting the SPARTAN SCOUT to conduct IO 
missions.  If it is determined that the LCS and SPARTAN 
SCOUT would be viable assets to IO, we will evaluate if 
there are existing assets that would be able to provide 
comparable or better IO coverage. If it is determined that 
either the SCOUT and/or the LCS could and should, be 
                     
3 CJCS. Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Washington 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), I-10 
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configured for Information Operations, this thesis will 
review current IO mission approval doctrine and make 
suggestions to adapt the process in order to fully take 
advantage of the quick response capabilities of the LCS and 
SPARTAN SCOUT.  
 
D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
This thesis’ review of potential IO missions for the 
LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT could aid in the development of LCS 
flight one and beyond as well as future development of 
USVs.  
 
E. ROADMAP OF THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is organized in six chapters. Chapter II 
provides background on the development of both the LCS and 
the SPARTAN SCOUT.  This chapter will serve as the basis 
for illustrating the current IO configuration of the LCS 
and SPARTAN SCOUT.  In addition, this chapter will 
introduce aspects of each platform that could be used to 
support IO missions.  These aspects such as speed and 
maneuverability will be discussed in depth in later 
chapters.  
Chapter III discusses the feasibility and projected 
benefits of developing an IO module for the LCS.  It will 
illustrate how currently employed technology could be added 
to the LCS sea frame to make the LCS a viable IO tool in 
support of IO missions. In addition, it will illustrate how 
the inherent aspects of the LCS could be exploited to make 
the  LCS  an  asset  to IO missions. This chapter will also  
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include reasoning as to why the LCS provides unique 
benefits in support of IO missions that are currently 
covered by other platforms. 
Chapter IV discusses the reconfiguration of SPARTAN 
SCOUT for IO, much like Chapter III did for the LCS.  It 
will discuss how the inherent aspects of the SPARTAN SCOUT 
would make it a valuable asset to IO missions.   
Chapter V provides background on the current IO 
doctrine that governs the approval for IO missions, 
specifically PSYOP.  It will illustrate how this current 
process would not fully take advantage of the response 
speed that the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT could provide in 
rapidly developing IO situations and make recommendations 
for policy change.   
Chapter VI is the conclusion to the thesis. It 
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II. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) AND SPARTAN SCOUT 
DEVELOPMENT 
Small network combatants have an important role 
to play in 21st century naval warfare, and the 
reconfigurable Littoral Combat Ship may make 
important warfighting contributions as part of 
the Navy’s 21st century “Total Force Battle 
Network” (TFBN).4 
Robert O. Work 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
 
A. LCS OVERVIEW 
The development of the LCS became a program of record 
in November of 2001 when the Navy announced it would issue 
a revised Request for Proposal (RFP) for its future surface 
combatant program.  In this proposal the development of 
three surface combatants; the DDX, CGX and LCS was 
authorized.  From its inception, the LCS development 
process would be like no other Navy or DOD program.  The 
development would be in spirals and ensure a shift to open 
architecture.  Spiral development allows for the product to 
get to the field faster and allows industry the ability to 
incorporate new technology. The government writes contracts 
identifying the capabilities needed, but not the end 
requirement, industry then decides how to meet these 
capabilities. With spiral development the Navy program 
office would maintain a tight feedback loop with its 
contractors, designing the solution piece by piece.5  Also, 
                     
4 Robert O. Work, “Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship” 
(Center for Strategic and Budgetary, working paper of government LCS 
design team, 2004). 9. 
5 Joab Jackson, “Pentagon Backs Spiral Development.” Washington 
Technology, 9 June 2003. Database on-line. Available from URL: 
www.Washingtontechnology.com/news/18_5/cover-stories/20872-1.html. 
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for the first time a ship would be designed using a modular 
concept.  The design called for the LCS to be divided into 
core and mission modules.  The core would consist of those 
basic requirements necessary for the ship to operate.  For 
example, the navigation system, the engineering plant, self 
defense, and command, control, computers, communications, 
and intelligence (C4I) are all parts of the ship’s core.   
 
FIGURE 1. LEGO ® CONCEPT OF DESIGN FOR LCS6 
 
The mission modules consist of specific equipment 
necessary to perform very specific missions.  The missions 
for which modules are being developed include, Mine Warfare 
(MIW), Surface Warfare (SUW), and Undersea Warfare (USW).  
These modules are being designed with the requirement that 
                     
Accessed 3 February 2005. 
6 Jason Pawley, “Littoral Combat Ship: Overview” (Presented at 
Menneken Lecture Series, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, 19 August 2004.) 5.  
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the ship can be completely reconfigured for a different 
mission within three days.  According to Captain Donald 
Babcock, U.S. Navy, the LCS Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) Program Manager, the   development and employment 
the LCS is like playing with LEGO’s.  The core will be 
standing by to receive additional blocks (modules).  Unlike 
the LEGO’s that that are used in figure 1, the actual 
mission modules will be delivered in standard sized cargo 
containers.  These containers are lowered through a door in 
the flight deck into the mission module area.  The 
Reconfigurable Mission Systems Interface Control Document 
(ICD) for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for Detail Design 
Phase states: 
The LCS platform shall be designed to accommodate 
multiple reconfigurable modular mission packages 
to accomplish focused missions via an open and 
modular design that provides flexibility and ease 
of upgrade while ensuring rapid and successful 
installation and integration of the mission 
packages to the platform. To permit use of a wide 
range of both present and future mission systems 
and to permit platform and mission systems to be 
developed independently, standard interfaces in 
the form of a standard technical architecture 
must be used.  Industry shall design and build 
the LCS platform employing an open modular 
architecture for mission systems based on this 
standard technical architecture.  Separately, 
mission modules will be developed for the LCS 
based on this technical architecture.7   
From this statement comes the next transformational 
aspect of the LCS development.  That is the idea that 
industry will play a significant role in how this ship is 
built.  The Navy has awarded contracts to Lockheed Martin 
                     
7 Naval Sea Systems, “Draft (ICD) Interface Control Document”(working 
paper of government LCS design team, 13 Sep 2004) 5. 
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and General Dynamics for each company to produce two LCS’. 
The ships will be produced by each company completely 
independent of the other. In order to ensure that industry 
will drive the development of the LCS, the Navy has 
produced a document called the Capability Development 
Document (CDD) for Littoral Combat Ship.  This CDD provides 
the desired performance attributes required for each of the 
contractors to meet in order to produce a LCS.  In order to 
force each contractor to view cost as an independent 
variable (CAIV) the navy has assigned a 220 million dollar 
price tag to development, production, and testing of the 
LCS.   
 
FIGURE 2. LOCKHEED MARTIN VERSION OF LCS8 
 
FIGURE 3. GENERAL DYNAMICS VERSION OF LCS9 
 
These performance attributes or requirements are very broad 
in order to provide industry an incentive to exercise as 
much initiative as possible.   
                     
8 LCS homepage, Available from URL: www.peos.crane.navy.mil/lcs/ 
Lockheed.htm. Accessed 4 February 2005.  
9 Ibid. 
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NAVSEA provided the following requirements to Lockheed 
Martin (LM) and General Dynamics (GD) regarding the LCS 
communications package, “LCS Flight 0 will have sufficient 
communications capability to ensure accurate and timely 
transmission and reception of multi-media information in 
coordination with naval, joint and combined forces as well 
as interagency data (shore sites/facilities), including 
interaction with those units that rely in whole, or in 
part, upon voice communications.”10  This is a very generic 
requirement allowing each contractor the ability to 
determine how to best achieve the requirement.  This open 
minded development procedure is applied to the sea frame or 
core as well as the mission modules.  In addition to rapid 
module change out, some specific requirements that the Navy 
has asked both contractors to provide are a shallow draft 
of less then 20 feet, speed between 40 (threshold) and 50 
knots (objective), and have a nominal endurance of 3,500 
nautical miles. As a part of the core systems and specific 
mission modules, the LCS will be equipped with at least one 
manned helicopter as well as unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), and manned and 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).  The Lockheed Martin 
version of LCS is developing a stern ramp for launch and 
recovery of manned and unmanned boats, an extendable rail 
system for launch and recovery of USVs and a Talon system11 
on the flight deck for recovery of manned and unmanned 
aerial vehicles.                        
10 Naval Sea Systems, “Capability Development Document for Littoral 
Combat Ship”(working paper of government LCS design team, April 2004) 
9-2. 
11 The Talon System (also known as in deck light harpoon) is a grid 
and probe aircraft recovery system that is similar to the system being 
used for UAV recovery.  
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B. LCS COMBAT SYSTEMS  
The LCS is being designed with a combat system that 
provides sufficient self defense capabilities that will 
allow the LCS to operate independently, or as part of a 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) or Expeditionary Strike 
Force (ESF).  Of interest to this thesis, the combat system 
will include the ability to transmit and receive on HF, 
VHF, UHF, SHF and SATCOM.  Additionally, the LCS will be 
equipped with non-secure internet protocol network 
(NIPRNET), secure internet protocol network (SIPRNET) and 
joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) data 
connections.  As of September 2004, the LM version of LCS 
is being configured with minimal Electronic Warfare (EW) 
capability, that being Electronic Support Measures (ESM), 
to assist in contact identification.  The LCS will be 
equipped with an electro-optical infrared scanner designed 
mainly for use in identifying surface contacts, but will 
have the ability to assist Naval Surface Fire Support 
(NSFS) in splash spotting and battle damage assessment 
(BDA). 
 
C. SPARTAN SCOUT OVERVIEW 
SPARTAN SCOUT meets a need for ship force 
protection… SPARTAN SCOUT can provide 
surveillance in a harbor, not only for Navy ships 
but also U.S. Coast Guard units responsible for 
port security. It can be modified for mine 
detection or anti-submarine warfare. 
Rear Adm. James Stavridis 
Commander of the Enterprise Strike Group12 
                      
12  Naval Undersea Warfare Command Public Affairs Officer, “Spartan 
Deployed on Gettysburg,” Navy News Stand, 23 December 2003.  Available 
from URL: http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=10964. 
Accessed 19 February, 2005. 
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FIGURE 4. SPARTAN SCOUT TEST BED MODEL13 
 
The USV that will be deployed on at least the first 
LCS will be the SPARTAN SCOUT. As of September 2004, there 
was still debate regarding the future development of USV’s 
for the Navy.  This debate is between Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center who designed the SCOUT and the Office of 
Naval Research who in conjunction with the Surface Warfare 
Center of NAVSEA is designing a USV called the Unmanned Sea 
Surface Vehicle (USSV).  The major difference between the 
SCOUT and the USSV is that the USSV will be built as an 
unmanned vehicle from the ground up, where as the SCOUT is 
simply  a  seven or eleven meter rigid hull inflatable boat  
                     
13 Pat Holder, “SPARTAN SCOUT ACTD Unmanned Surface Vessel for 
Assured Access and Force Protection” (presentation presented at 
Logistics from the Sea Symposium, Washington DC, 4-7 February 2003). 
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(RHIB) modified for unmanned operations.   As the SCOUT 
will be the USV on the first LCS, it will be the USV 
considered in this study.  
The SCOUT was designed to be an integrated weapon 
system and a primary force leveler against asymmetric 
threats, enabling the battleforce commander to match lesser 
threats with an appropriate, inexpensive response.14  
According to the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD) management plan the SCOUT will be an additional 
asset to the warfare commander with the capability to 
conduct critical missions (MIW, ISR/FP, SUW), prepare the 
water space for sealift operations, and when launched or 
operated from shore, provide port protection.  The 
management plan goes on to say that the SCOUT has the 
potential to benefit the warfighter by extending the range 
of detecting a threat, providing the ability to establish 
defensive barriers, minimize the risk to personnel and 
capital assets and serve as a force multiplier or leveler.15  
It is important to note that the management plan does not 
address the use of SCOUT for Information Operations (IO) 
missions. The main focus for the SCOUT as with all Naval 
USV’s has been in the mission areas of force protection, 
MIW and SUW.   
The SCOUT, like LCS, will be built with a modular 
design  and in several spirals.  The core of the SCOUT will  
                     
14 Naval Undersea Warfare Command, “SPARTAN SCOUT ACTD Management 
Plan Rev 1” (Working paper for SPARTAN SCOUT design team, 14 March  
2003) 1.  
15 “SPARTAN SCOUT ACTD Management Plan Rev 1”, 6. 
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be capable of carrying payloads of 3,200 lbs for the seven 
meter model and approximately 5,000 lbs for the eleven 
meter model.16   



















Levels the Battlespace by Distributing the Combat System
UUVs
 
FIGURE 5. SPARTAN SCOUT BLOS COMMUNICATIONS17 
 
Beginning in fiscal year 2006, the third spiral or 
version of the SCOUT should be completed and capable of 
conducting missions such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) and Force Protection (FP) using an 
Integrated Radar Optical Sighting System (IROSS) coupled 
with a 7.62mm gattling gun (GAU-17) for moving targets, MIW 
using an AQS-14 Side Scan Sonar, SUW employing the 
Hellfire/Javelin Missile for moving targets at sea, and C3 
(Command, Control and Communication) extending Beyond the 
                     
16 Surface Warfare Magazine, Summer 2004, Vol 29, No 3 Pg 39. 
17 Holder “SPARTAN SCOUT ACTD Unmanned Surface Vessel for Assured 
Access and Force Protection”, 2003. 
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line of sight capability.18  As seen in Figure 5 the SCOUT 
will have three options in extending it’s beyond Line-of-
Sight (BLOS) communications out to 100 nautical miles.  It 
will be cable of relaying communications through manned and 
unmanned aerial vehicles, manned and unmanned surface 
















                     
18 “SPARTAN SCOUT ACTD Management Plan Rev 1”, 6. 
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III. CONFIGURATION OF LCS FOR IO 
Generally, in battle, use the normal force 
(direct approach) to engage; use the 
extraordinary (indirect approach) to win.  
 Sun Tzu, The Art of War. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the first LCS Flight Zero model scheduled for 
delivery in December of 2006 now is the time to recommend 
any modifications that could be incorporated into the final 
design of the sea frame.   In exploring how the LCS’ sea 
frame could be configured to support IO missions, one must 
first start with systems that are already in existence.   
 
B. OUTBOARD AN/SSQ-108 
The Classic OUTBOARD (Organizational Unit Tactical 
Baseline Operational Area Radio Detection) countermeasures 
exploitation system, AN/SSQ-108(v), could be added to the 
design of LCS.  OUTBOARD is a U.S. Navy shipboard combat 
direction finding system that has historically been 
installed in Guided Missile Destroyers and Cruisers.  
OUTBOARD provides electronic warfare signals acquisition 
and direction finding systems with the capability to 
detect, locate, and identify hostile targets at long-
ranges, and input this information into the shipboard 
tactical data system. With the introduction of the more 
cost effective LCS (a ship designed to operate closer to 
shore) adding the OUTBOARD system would be a justifiable 
modification.   Because LCS will operate closer to shore 
the ability to intercept signals would be improved over the 
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distantly operating DDG or CG.  Because the LCS cost a 
fraction of what the DDG or CG cost to produce it would 
free these high priced, high value assets from the OUTBOARD 
missions for other critical core missions. 
 
C. AFLOAT PRINT PRODUCTION SYSTEM (APPS) 
Another proposed configuration change for the LCS is 
the development of an IO module.  Similar to the other 
warfare area modules (e.g. MIW, SUW, ASW) the LCS could be 
configured with the IO module when specifically tasked to 
conduct IO related missions.  This IO module would contain 
equipment required for leaflet production such as the 
Afloat Print Production System (APPS) that has been 
successfully used by USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) and USS FORT 
MCHENRY (LSD 43).   
In response to the Carrier Battle Group’s Information 
Warfare Commander’s (IWC) request the Fleet Information 
Warfare Command developed and installed the prototype APPS 
on USS CONSTELLATION prior to her 2003 deployment.  This 
APPS consists of two Risograph duplicators, two Dell laptop 
computers and one heavy-duty paper cutter. This equipment 
provides the high speed (120 pages per minute) and high 
volume (86,000 single color leaflets per hour) required to 
produce PSYOP leaflets for distribution.19  These shipboard 
produced leaflets were distributed via the PDU-5/B bomb 
dropped from Carrier Airwing aircraft.  While the number of 
personnel that were involved in this evolution is unclear, 
the results of this exercise displayed that the entire 
                     
19 John Solt, “Psychological Operations Go to Sea” FIWC INFOSCOPE 
Winter 2003, Volume 2, Issue 1.  Available from FIWC website at URL: 
http://www.infoscope.fiwc.navy.smil.mil/vol2_issue2/index.htm. Accessed 
12 October, 2004. 
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process of producing, cutting, rolling, and loading 100,000 
leaflets into a PDU-5/B could be accomplished in 
approximately 12 hours.20 
 
D. COMMANDO SOLO 
In addition to the APPS equipment an LCS IO module 
would include radio and television broadcast equipment much  
like what is found in the EC-130 COMMAND SOLO aircraft.21   
 
FIGURE 6. EXAMPLE OF ACTUAL LEAFLET USED IN AFGHANISTAN.22 
Translation:  STOP! TURN AWAY NOW! 
"The Partnership of Nations has secured the Qandahar 
Airport to ensure that Humanitarian Aid will reach the 
people of this area for your own safety please stay away" 
HELP US KEEP YOU SAFE 
                     
20 Solt, “Psychological Operations Go to Sea”. 
21 193rd Special Operations Wing (ANG), Harrisburg, PA. 
22 Available from the PSYWARRIOR website.    
 URL:http:// www.psywarrior.com. Accessed 15 February 2005. 
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Again, with a majority of the LCS missions being conducted 
in the littorals and closer to shore, these radio and 
television broadcasts could be tailored and focused to 
reach a more specific audience.  For example, several days 
prior to a fleet of ships entering a port where security 
may be an issue the LCS operating in close proximity to the 
port could broadcast warnings regarding the ships mission 
and the consequences to an enemy if the ships are attacked.   
In addition, the LCS leaflet production capability could be 
used to deliver focused leaflets to this specific port, 
much like what was done at the Qandahar Airport during 
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (Figure 6). 
While it is true that COMMANDO SOLO (Figure 7) has 
been and will continue to be a primary asset that is tasked 
to deliver focused messages in support of the Joint Force 
Commanders campaign plan, there are certain unique benefits 
that a broadcast system onboard the LCS provides the 
warfare commander. 
 
FIGURE 7. EXTERIOR AND INTERIOR VIEW OF COMMANDO SOLO23 
 
                     
23 American Forces Information Services website. Available from: 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/afghanistan/commando-solo.htm. 
Accessed 17 February 2005. 
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According to a COMMANDO SOLO commander, the EC-130 has 
been called a ‘weapon of mass persuasion’. Equipping the 
LCS for the mission of PSYOP broadcast would allow focused 
and localized messages to be delivered over longer time 
periods.  By keeping the broadcast area limited the message 
being delivered can be tailored to appeal to the target 
group without the fear of offending other groups.  The on-
station time is increased when using a broadcast from the 
LCS as compared to that of COMMANDO SOLO and the LCS does 
not have the concern of access to ports within a mission 
radius which may limit COMMANDO SOLO.   In addition, it 
simply makes sense and is cost effective to use the 
equipment that is already available and that has been 
operationally validated. 
 
E. TRANSPORTABLE AM/FM RADIO BROADCAST SYSTEM (TARBS) 
In 2003, in addition to the APPS exercise onboard the 
USS MCHENRY (LSD-43), a test of the newly developed 
Transportable AM/FM Radio Broadcast System (TARBS) was 
conducted off the coast of Okinawa.  During this test, 
messages produced by the 4th Psychological Operations Group 
(POG) where able to be broadcast to target audiences in the 
littorals.24  According to Joint Publication 3-53 Doctrine 
for Joint Psychological Operations: 
TARBS is comprised of an audio transmitter and 
antenna subsystems capable of operations ashore 
or afloat. When needed, TARBS will broadcast 
voice information as directed and authorized by 
the Joint Force Commander (JFC). PSYOP broadcast 
information products will be produced for the JFC 
by the 4th POG (Airborne) or the JPOTF supporting 
the JFC, and forwarded to the TARBS operators for 
                     
24 Solt, “Psychological Operations Go to Sea”.   
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final dissemination. The products will be 
forwarded either electronically to the TARBS 
laptop computer or by other means as necessary 
(e.g., cassette and compact disc-read only 
memory). Once authorized by the JFC, the TARBS 
operators will conduct both AM and FM broadcasts 
of this product on designated frequencies.25 
Joint Publication 3-53 goes on to say, “TARBS ideally 
will be installed onboard one ship in each amphibious ready 
group.”26 As the LCS is being designed to assist in reducing 
the role of the U.S. Navy’s aging amphibious fleet it only 
makes sense that TARBS be included in an LCS IO Module.  As 
TARBS is designated as a portable system divided into three 
subsystems, mostly contained in a transportable shelter 173 
inches long, 86 inches wide, and 84 inches high, with an 
approximate loaded weight of 9,600 pounds it could easily 
be configured to fit into the IO module in the LCS.27 
 
F. HIGH POWER MICROWAVE (HPM) AND ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE 
(EMP) 
In the realm of emerging technology, the addition of 
the developmental High Power Microwave (HPM) and 
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons would provide the 
ability for the LCS to be an asset for offensive IO 
missions.  The development of HPM devices is of interest to 
many different communities, specifically the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DoE), and the 
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) community.  For the DoD 
interests there are ultra-wide and narrowband applications.  
                     
25 CJCS. Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations (Washington DC: 




Narrowband technology operates in the 1 to 100 GHz range, 
and the ultra-wideband operates in the 10 MHz to 10 GHz 
range.  The production of narrow and ultra-wideband pulses 
require different power sources and produce significantly 
different results.  Narrowband pulses are extremely precise 
and are able to be aimed at a specific target; analogous to 
a laser.  Ultra-wideband pulses provide coverage to large 
areas; analogous to a flash bulb.28  
The main application for the ultra-wideband technology 
that is being developed by the DoD is for active non-lethal 
denial purposes in crowd control.  The DOD is developing 
narrow band technology for electronic attack purposes. As 
narrowband is the technology that would provide the LCS 
with an Electronic Warfare (EW) capability we will focus on 
it’s application.  Figure 8 shows a block diagram of how a 
narrow band pulse is produced.  While still under 
development the inclusion of this HPM equipment in an IO 
module would allow the LCS to direct an antenna toward a 
target located miles away and with the precision of a laser 
conduct an electronic attack.  This narrowband weapon is 
able to penetrate concrete bunkers and would be effective 
even on equipment that has been shielded from nuclear 
produced Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP).29       
                     
28 E. Schamiloglu, “High Powered Microwave Sources and Applications”. 
IEEE MTT-S Digest, (2004): 1000. 









[-------------Microwave       Source-----------------]
 
FIGURE 8. HPM NARROWBAND PRODUCTION BLOCK DIAGRAM30 
Pulsed power is the technology that converts 
some prime power source (whether the line voltage 
in the laboratory, jet turbine on an aircraft, or 
battery pack on an unmanned drone) into a short, 
properly tailored, high voltage pulse.  High 
voltage capacitors, together with fast switching 
techniques, are typically used to accomplish 
this.  Once the pulse power portion of the system 
produces the desirable high voltage waveform, it 
is applied to an electron gun, also known as an 
electron beam diode.  The electron beam diode 
produces a high perveance electron beam where 
space-charged effects dominate the interaction.  
The relativistic electron beam, once generated, 
propagates through a radio frequency (rf) 
interaction region, which converts the beam’s 
kinetic energy into HPM.31 
Another non-kinetic weapon in development that would 
provide the LCS the ability to conduct offensive EW 
missions is the E-bomb.  While figures 9 and 10 provide the 
anatomy of a theoretical E-bomb, there is speculation that 
the E-bomb was tested in the early days of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM. 
                     
30 Schamiloglu, “High Powered Microwave Sources and Applications,” 
1001. 
31 Ibid., 1002-1003. 
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FIGURE 9. DIAGRAM OF AN E-BOMB32 
 
FIGURE 10. DIAGRAM OF E-BOMB NOSE CONE33   
 
According to a Time magazine article written by Mark 
Thompson in January of 2003, the use of microwave weapons 
would be one of the legacies of the second Gulf War.34  
After seeing footage of a U.S. bomb destroying an Iraqi 
television studio, Howard Seguine, an expert on emerging 
weapons technology with Decisive Analytics Corporation 
said, “I saw the detonation, and then saw the burst-which                      
32 Abrams, “The Dawn of the E-bomb,” 25. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Mark Thompson, “America’s Ultra-Secret Weapon”. Time, (January 27, 
2003. Volume 161 Number 4). 
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wasn’t much.  If they took the station out with that blast, 
I strongly suspect that we used Iraq as a proving ground 
for HPMs.”35 As seen in Figure 11, Dr. Schamilogu36 is 
holding a wave guide and antenna capable of producing high 
power microwaves.  This HPM technology exists and should be 
part of a LCS IO module.  
 
FIGURE 11. ACTUAL HIGH POWER MICROWAVE EQUIPMENT37 
 
G. MODULE MANNING 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 strengthened the 
concept of joint operations with the DoD.  In the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) the Secretary of 
Defense directed that all branches of the Armed Forces                      
35 Abrams, “The Dawn of the E-bomb,” 26. 
36 Leading Electromagnetic expert from the University of New Mexico.  
37 Abrams, “The Dawn of the E-bomb,” 26. 
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provide a roadmap illustrating how they will become a 
transformational force.  Also included in the 2001 QDR was 
this direction for joint operations: 
To better meet future warfare challenges, DoD 
must develop the ability to integrate combat 
organizations with forces capable of responding 
rapidly to events that occur with little or no 
warning. These joint forces must be scalable and 
task-organized into modular units to allow the 
combatant commanders to draw on the appropriate 
forces to deter or defeat an adversary. The 
forces must be highly networked with joint 
command and control, and they must be better able 
to integrate into combined operations than the 


































FIGURE 12. EXAMPLE OF PROPOSED MINE WARFARE MANNING39 
 
                     
38 Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review. (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2001), 32. 
39 Rob Abbott, LCS Mission Package Manning Overview. (Washington DC: 
PEO Ships, 2005).  
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Current mission module manning for LCS consists of all 
naval personnel (Figure 12). As no one branch of the armed 
forces is the IO authority and in keeping with the 
Secretary of Defense’s direction, the manning for a LCS IO 
module would optimally consist of members of the Army, Air 
Force and Navy. Air Force personnel would be provided by 
the 67th Information Operations Wing (IOW), who for the 
past ten years have led the charge in executing the next 
order of battle on the information highways.40 In addition 
to Air Force technicians the IO module would include a 
junior officer to act a liaison with the Information 
Warfare Flight (IWF) and the Air and Space Operations 
Center (AOC).  According to Air Force IO doctrine, in times 
of war the IWF becomes the Air Force’s key IO expertise 
whereas the AOC typically is the main organizational 
structure through which the capabilities of EW operations, 
net warfare (NW) operations and influence operations 
planning and execution are integrated and synchronized.41      
Members of the Army’s Psychological Operations Groups 
(POG), specifically the 4th POG, would make up part of the 
IO module.  According to Army literature, the 4th POG 
(Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is the only 
active psychological    operations unit, constitutes 26 
percent of all U.S. Army psychological operations units.42 
Similar to the Air Force manning, in addition to 
                     
40 Bruce Bingle, “67th IOW Crystallizes Operations” Available from 
URL: http://aia.lackland.af.mil/homepages/pa/spokesman/jun04/cc.cfm. 
Accessed 23 February 2005. 
41 Secretary of the Air Force. Information Operations AFDD 2-5 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 11, 2005), 33. 
42 Herbert L. Altshuler. United States Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command. Available from URL: 
http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/psyopfs.shtml. Accessed 23 February 2005. 
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technicians a junior officer would act as a liaison to 
coordinate with The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). USACAPOC, 
headquarter at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is a subordinate 
command of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).43 
In addition to a module Officer In Charge (OIC) and 
technicians, the Navy would provide a junior officer to act 
as a liaison with the Naval Information Warfare Activity 
(NIWA). NIWA at Ft Meade is the Navy's principal technical 
agent to research, assess, develop, and prototype 
Information Warfare (IW) capabilities.44  Figure 13 shows 
the proposed members of the IO module team onboard the LCS 
that would be in support of the Joint Force Commander 
(JFC).   
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FIGURE 13. PROPOSED IO MODULE MANNING  
                     
43 Herbert L. Altshuler. United States Army Civil Affairs and 
Psychological Operations Command. Available from URL: 
http://www.soc.mil/usacapoc/psyopfs.shtml. Accessed 23 February 2005. 
44 Federation of American Scientists website. Available from 























IV. CONFIGURATION OF THE SPARTAN SCOUT FOR IO 
The real target in war is the mind of the enemy 
command, not the bodies of his troops.  If we 
operate against his troops it is fundamentally 
for the effect that action will produce on the 
mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend 
of warfare and development of new weapons—promise 
to give us increased and more direct 
opportunities of striking at this psychological 
target. 
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart 
Thoughts on War, 1944 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The SPARTAN SCOUT like the LCS, is still under 
development making now the optimal time to study and 
recommend configuration changes.  In September of 2004 I 
visited Dr. Ricci and his SPARTAN SCOUT at the Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) in Newport, Rhode Island. 
While Dr Ricci assisted his team in the installation of a 
mock hellfire missile and actual IROSS gun, Dr. Ricci 
admitted that, “While we've always understood it could be 
used in Info Ops, we haven't spent a great deal in 
development of that concept.”45  This chapter will provide 
recommendations to develop an IO module for SPARTAN SCOUT 
using existing and developmental technologies.  
 
B. LOUDSPEAKERS 
The first technology to be considered for an IO module 
for the SPARTAN SCOUT is the ‘tried and true’ loudspeaker.  
Loudspeakers have been used by U.S. forces for PSYOP 
                     
45 Dr. Vic Ricci, interview by author, Newport, RI. 24 September 
2004. 
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dissemination in every conflict since WWII.  They proved to 
be most effective during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama 
where they were credited with reducing casualties on both 
sides.46  According to the Final Report to Congress for the 
Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:  
Loudspeaker teams were used effectively 
throughout the theater. Each tactical maneuver 
brigade had loudspeaker PSYOP teams attached. 
Many of the 66 teams came from the Army Reserve 
Components. Loudspeaker teams accompanied units 
into Iraq and Kuwait, broadcasting tapes of 
prepared surrender messages. Messages were 
transmitted in Arabic and were developed by cross 
cultural teams. These messages were similar to 
those on the leaflets being dropped. Iraqi 
soldiers were encouraged to surrender, were 
warned of impending bombing attacks, and told 
they would be treated humanely and fairly.…  
…UH-1Ns used loudspeakers and Arab linguists to 
convince Iraqi soldiers to surrender along the 
Kuwait border. The message to the Iraqi soldier 
was that Saddam Hussein was deliberately 
endangering their religion and families.…   
…Many Enemy Prisoners of War mentioned hearing 
the loudspeaker broadcasts in their area and 
surrendered to the Coalition forces because they 
feared more bombing.47 
In May of 2000 the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task 
Force submitted their report on The Creation and 
Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of 
Psychological Operations in Time of Military Conflict.  The 
DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide 
                     
46 Robert W. Caspers, Joint Task Force South in Operations Just 
Cause, An Oral History Interview. (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, 1990), 8. 
47 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Final Report to Congress for the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, April 
1992. 192, 623. 
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independent advice to the Secretary of Defense.48  The DSB 
Task Force was established due to the limitations exhibited 
in military operations in the Balkans, where the Commando 
Solo (EC 130E) aircraft were unable to effectively 
disseminate TV and radio broadcasts.   The DSB recommended 
that United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
investigate the creation of small and easily reconfigurable 
information-dissemination packages that would be compatible 
with multiple platforms, including UAVs and leased 
aircraft, for a variety of missions.49  The report goes on 
to recommend that future tactical PSYOP teams no longer be 
loadspeaker teams.  The DSB recommended that PSYOP messages 
be routed through wireless networks to unmanned speakers 
and that loudspeakers should be mounted on tanks and 
dropped in the enemy area.  The goal being to free the 
tactical PSYOP units to conduct electronic news and image 
gathering in order to produce more effective PSYOP 
material.50  
While the recommendations of the DSB do not 
specifically address seaborne application of PSYOP 
dissemination it is clear that fitting the SPARTAN SCOUT 
with loudspeakers would comply with the overall intentions 
of the committee.  Another reason to develop loudspeakers 
for the SPARTAN SCOUT is an ongoing effort by the Marine 
Corps with respect to loudspeaker systems. 
                        
48 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, The Creation and 
Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological 
Operations in Time of Military Conflict. (Washington DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2000) i. 
49 Ibid., 4. 
50 Ibid., 10. 
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C. LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE (LRAD) 
In May of 2004, in order to explore non-lethal options 
for handling force protection, the 24th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU) conducted tests on the X-Net, Long Range 
Acoustic Device (LRAD) and the Vehicle Non-Lethal Munition 
(VENOM).51 
 
FIGURE 14. EXAMPLES OF LRAD EMPLOYENT52 
 
The LRAD is an experimental technology that should be 
considered for incorporation into an IO module for SPARTAN 
SCOUT.  The LRAD is disc shaped loudspeaker being developed 
                     
51 Sara Beavers, “24 MEU Conducts Non-lethal Training During TRUEX” 
Marine Link, May 2004. Available from URL: 
http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/lookupstoryref/2004525152
639. Accessed 19 February 2005. 
52 American Technology Corporation. “LRAD: The Sound of Force 
Protection”, Available from ATC website. URL:http://www.atcsd.com. 
Accessed 15 February 2005. 
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by American Technology Corporation (Figure 14).  The LRAD 
is a 33 inch diameter disc that is capable of clearly 
delivering a message to a range of more than 500 meters.53  
With it’s small, lightweight size, and minimum power 
requirements (Table 1) not only would the LRAD provide  
excellent PYSOP dissemination capabilities for the SPARTAN 
SCOUT, it could also be used in a form of electronic attack 
(EA).   
 
 
TABLE 1.   LRAD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS54 
 
One of the features of the LRAD is the ability to 
deliver a sound burst of 150dB at a frequency of 2,100 to 
3,100 Hertz.55 While this sound burst will not completely 
                     
53 American Technology Corporation. “LRAD: The Sound of Force 
Protection”. 
54 Ibid. 
55 “US Troops Have Sound Weapon,” Washington Times, 7 March 2004.  
Available from URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/archive/.  Accessed 
19 February 2005. 
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incapacitate an individual it would provide behavior 
modification.  Adding the LRAD to the IO module of the 
SPARTAN SCOUT would provide the ability for non-lethal EA.  
The next technology that should be added to the SPARTAN 
SCOUT IO module would offer a lethal EA capability.  Again 
we look toward a Marine Corps initiative to develop a 
mobile phased array electronic attack antenna.    
 
D. COMINT EMITTER SENSING AND ATTACK SYSTEM (CESAS) 
In a March 2004 Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MARCORSYSCOM) message, the Marine Corps delineated what 
equipment and systems would comprise their C4I needs when a 
Marine unit embarks a ship.  They addressed COMINT Emitter 
Sensing and Attack System (CESAS), a mobile phased array 
electronic antenna.  According to MARCORSYCOM the CESAS 
would be a tier three piece of equipment, meaning it would 
deploy with the MAGTF whenever they embarked a LHD or LHA.    
 
 
FIGURE 15. OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH CESAS CONCEPTUAL 
DRAWING56                      
56  ONR Future Naval Capabilities website. URL: 
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CESAS (Figure 15) is a Phased Array Electronic Attack 
Antenna, operating across a frequency range of 150-2500 
MHz, that will enable on-the-move disruption of hostile RF 
communications by providing a steerable beam of jamming 
energy while retaining omni-directional receive 
capability.57 According to the Office of Naval Research 
CESAS is a MARCORSYSCOM program that is being developed by 
BAE Systems Information and Electronic Warfare Department 
and is in the prototype and testing phase.58    
As CESAS’ development has already been funded and is 
schedule for final delivery in 2006 it would be cost 
effective to include this technology in an IO module for 
SPARTAN SCOUT providing another method for engaging in 
Electronic Attack (EA).  Additionally, as the Marine Corps 
has identified CESAS as equipment that they will deploy 
with each time they embark a LHA or LHD and as the LCS with 
SPARTAN SCOUTs are being designed to assist in reducing the 
role of the U.S. Navy’s aging amphibious fleet, it is 
logical to include CESAS in an IO module for SPARTAN SCOUT.   
 
E. AIR MAGNET  
Another tool that should be included in the IO module of 
SPARTAN SCOUT would be an air magnet or similar device used 
for mapping Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN).  The 
inclusion of this technology would provide the ability for 
the SPARTAN SCOUT to assist in Special Information 
Operations (SIO) missions that may include Computer Network 
                     
http://www.onr.navy.mil/fncs/explog/litcom/product.asp?productid=65&div




Attack (CNA).  An Air Magnet as designed is a tool for 
network administrators to monitor the health of their 
existing wireless network or for planners to use to develop 
a wireless network.  An additional use for an air magnet is 
the ability to locate and possibly penetrate existing 
wireless networks using the 802.11 standard protocol.  Once 
inside the network the operator could conduct surveillance 
(Figure 16), disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks or the 
computers and networks themselves59.  Inclusion of this 
Commercial Off The Self (COTS) equipment, with minor 
alteration for military use, in an IO module would be of 




FIGURE 16. EXAMPLE OF AIR MAGNET IN LAPTOP FORM AND SCREEN 
EXAMPLE OF AIR MAGNET MONITORING WLAN60 
 
                     
59 JP 3-13. I-9. 
60 Available from Air Magnet Corporation website. URL: 
http://www.airmagnet.com/news/image_library.htm. Accessed 15 February 
2005.  
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V. IO DOCTRINE REVIEW 
The approval chain for PSYOP [psychological 
operations] should be as short and streamlined as 
possible to facilitate timely review, approval, 
production and dissemination. Although 
coordination of PSYOP with other staff elements 
and organizations is absolutely critical in 
maximizing PSYOP effectiveness, the coordination 
process should not be so cumbersome as to 
adversely impact dissemination necessary to 
achieve the intended effect. 
CJCSI 3110.05B, Joint Psychological Operations  
Supplement to the Joint Strategic  
Capabilities Plan FY 1998  
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the introduction of the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT 
there will once again be a divide between technology and 
doctrine.  The current doctrine governing IO mission 
approval will not allow JFC’s the ability to use the LCS 
and SPARTAN SCOUT to their full potential.  Under current 
IO doctrine the use of the suggested equipment in chapters 
III and IV would not be able to be utilized in many rapidly 
developing or changing IO missions in a high paced 
operational enviornment.  To illustrate this limitation 
created by IO doctrine this chapter will provide a 
historical account for a technology and doctrine mismatch 
and an objective and doctrine mismatch.  It will discuss 
how the wrong doctrine in a fast paced information age as 
we are now in can produce devastating results. This chapter 
will provide examples of the approval process governed by 
current joint IO doctrine and current PSYOP doctrine to 
illustrate the time consuming complexity of the process.   
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B. CULTURE-BOUND HISTORY 
This mismatch between technology and doctrine is not a 
new phenomenon.  Looking back in history there are many 
examples as to how outdated doctrine caused significant 
advances in technology to be disregarded.  In the mid 
1800’s as the U.S. Navy was beginning to experiment with 
steam as a prime mover for ships the USS Wampanoag was 
built.  The Wampanoag was commissioned in 1868, she 
measured 355 feet on the waterline; her beam was 45.2 feet; 
she displaced 4200 tons and was able to maintain a speed of 
almost 18 knots.61 For her time she was heavily armed, of 
good size and maintained a speed 3 knots faster then any 
other ship on the water.   During sea trials she handled 
well in heavy seas, maneuvered well and according to 
special observers of the Secretary of the Navy she was 
steady, efficient and easy.62  Despite how revolutionary and 
well built the Wampanoag was she was cursed by a culture 
bound by sailing doctrine. 
In 1869, one year after commissioning, the Wampanoag 
found herself under review by a board of naval officers 
appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to report on all 
steam vessels in the Navy.63  According to the boards 
findings found in U.S. Document 1411 of the 41st Congress, 
2nd session: 
The steam vessel was not a school of seamanship 
for officers or men. Lounging through the watches 
of a steamer, or acting as fireman and coal 
heavers, will not produce in a seaman that 
                     
61 Elting E. Morison. Men Machine and Modern Times, The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Cambridge Mass. 1966. p 98-99. 
62 Ibid., 115.  
63 Ibid., 114. 
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combination of boldness, strength, and skill 
which characterized the American sailor of an 
elder day; and the habitual exercise by an 
officer, of a command, the execution of which is 
not under his own eye, is a poor substitute for 
the school of observation, promptness and command 
found only on the deck of a sailing vessel.64  
The board concluded that the Wampanoag was a sad 
failure, utterly unfit to be retained in the service, and 
that she was so much of an abortion no amount of changes 
could be made to improve her.65  Because the culture of the 
time was driven by doctrine for sailing vessels the 
Wampanoag was placed in lay up and some years later sold 
out of the Navy.   
Another example of this technology doctrine mismatch 
involves the development of the B-10 and B-17 bombers by 
the U.S. Army Air Corps in the early 1930’s.  At the time 
of the B-10 and B-17 development the current doctrine 
derived from WWI was that bombers would be escorted by 
fighters for defensive purposes.  The problem with the B-10 
and B-17 bombers was that their design allowed them to fly 
faster and further than the available fighters that would 
provide escort.66 Because of this culture the fixed 
perception was that bombers would have fighter escorts and 
despite prevailing Army Air Corps doctrine that indicated 
the majority of interceptor attacks could be expected to 
                     
64 Morision, Men Machine and Modern Times. 98-99. 
65 Ibid., 115. 
66 Irving B. Holley, Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a 
Challenging Relationship. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, AL. August 
2004. 80-81.  
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approach within a 30 degree cone aft of the tail, the B-10 
and B-17 were designed without tail guns.67  
Once the B-17 was in production change to the design 
did not come easy for the bombers.  Despite congressional 
prodding of the Army Air Corps in 1934 after an 
appropriations committee noticed the Royal Air Force (RAF) 
had some 200 bombers with nose and tail guns it wasn’t 
until the grim realities of WWII that the B-17 was 
outfitted with nose and tail guns.68 
The fact that the LCS is being developed without 
concern for IO related missions causes fear that it may 
follow in the foot steps of these historical examples.  
Like the Wampanoag with a technology and doctrine mismatch 
the LCS may be discarded.  At best if the LCS is developed 
without planning for supporting IO missions it may be 
similar to the B-17 where change was difficult to 
implement.  
 
C. COLD WAR DOCTRINE 
Similar to the historical examples for a mismatch 
between doctrine and technology the current “war on terror” 
illustrates a mismatch between doctrine and objectives.  
Akin to the doctrine mismatch with technology this doctrine 
mismatch with objectives would limit the use of the LCS and 
SPARTAN SCOUT if outfitted with IO modules.    
In September of 2004, a Defense Science Board Task 
Force submitted their report on Strategic Communications to 
                     
67 Holley, Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging 
Relationship. 80 
68 Ibid., 81 
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the Secretary of Defense. According to this report 
Strategic Communications can be understood to embrace four 
core instruments: public diplomacy, public affairs, 
international broadcasting services and information 
operations.69  As the task force’s definition of ‘strategic 
communications’ includes IO, their findings and 
recommendations effect current and future doctrine that is 
and will be applied to the LCS and SPARTAN SCOUT IO 
modules.   
According to I.B. Holley, a Duke University History 
professor and retired Air Force Major General, “The essence 
of doctrine is that it springs from recorded past 
experience- the hard-won lessons of the past whether that 
experience is by one’s own forces in actual combat, the 
recorded participation of foreign forces in combat, or 
experience derived from extensive peacetime maneuvers and 
exercises.”70  The DSB task force found that when the U.S. 
government was faced with a new conflict (the war on 
terror,) because the Cold War template (doctrine) proved so 
effective a decade prior to September 11, 2001, without 
thought or care as to whether these were the best 
responses, made their decision based on this outdated 
doctrine.71   According to the DSB report, the following are 
reasons we need to move beyond outdated concepts, stale 
structural models, and institutionally based labels from 
Cold War doctrine: 
                     
69 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force, “Strategic 
Communications.” (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, September 
2004) 12-13. 
70 Holley, Technology and Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging 
Relationship. 80.  
71 Solt, “Strategic Communications,” 34. 
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The Cold War emphasized dissemination of 
information to “huddled masses yearning to be 
free.” Today we reflexively compare Muslim 
“masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. 
This is a strategic mistake. There is no 
yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. ground swell 
among Muslim societies — except to be liberated 
perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies 
that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and 
defends. 
The Cold War emphasized an enduringly stable 
propaganda environment. The Cold War was a status 
quo setting that emphasized routine message-
packaging — and whose essential objective was the 
most efficient enactment of the routine. In 
contrast the situation in Islam today is highly 
dynamic, and likely to move decisively in one 
direction or another. The U.S. urgently needs to 
think in terms of promoting actual positive 
change. 
The Cold War emphasized an acceptance of 
authoritarian regimes as long as they were anti-
communist. This could be glossed over in our 
message of freedom and democracy because it was 
the main adversary only that truly mattered. 
Today, however, the perception of intimate U.S. 
support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is 
perhaps the critical vulnerability in American 
strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, 
while strongly promoting that of the enemy.72 
 
D. FAST PACED INFORMATION AGE 
Like the dramatic effects the technology doctrine 
mismatch had on the Wampanoag and B-17 bomber this 
objective doctrine mismatch has produced dramatic results 
in the U.S. “War on Terror”.  The DSB report points out 
that often the first information to reach an audience (a 
global audience that is really a galaxy of niche audiences) 
                     
72 Solt, “Strategic Communications,” 36. 
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frames how an event is perceived and discussed – and thus 
can shape its ultimate impact.73  With the speed at which 
information regarding an event can be broadcast world wide, 
if the U.S. wants to have a chance in having its facts 
about the event to be accepted then they must act quickly.    
The DSB report shows how with technologies such as Arab 
satellite TV, cell phones, wireless handhelds, videophones, 
camcorders, digital cameras, miniaturized fly away units 
used by TV crews in remote locations, high resolution 
commercial space imaging, blogs, and email the world is 
becoming more transparent.74  Countering the speed at which 
the Arab media is using these technologies to create the 
frames within which people understand and misunderstand 
events and U.S. political goals is an area where the U.S. 
is failing.75  A June 2004 Zogby76 poll of Arab opinion 
shows the audience receptive to the U.S. message is 
miniscule (Table 2). 
                     
73 Solt, “Strategic Communications,” 38. 
74 Ibid., 19. 
75 Ibid., 19. 
76 Zogby International has been tracking public opinion since 1984 in 
North America, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia, and Europe in 
order to Offer the Best Polling, Market Research, & Information 
Services Worldwide Based on Accuracy & Detailed Strategic Information. 
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TABLE 2.   RESULTS OF JUNE 2004 ZOGBY POLL 
(RESULTS IN PERCENTAGES)77 
 
E. OVERVIEW OF IO PLAN APPROVAL  
As in other warfare areas IO has guidance for 
deliberate and crisis planning.  In both types of planning 
there are several layers of review, deconfliction, and 
approval. Table 4 illustrates the time consuming steps 
involved in deliberate planning while Table 3 shows the 
somewhat abbreviated process for crisis planning. 
                     
77 Solt, “Strategic Communications,” 44. 
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INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING  
RELATED TO CRISIS ACTION PLANNING  
PLANNING 
PHASE  
JOPES  IO CELL PLANNING ACTION  IO PLANNING OUTCOME  
PHASE I  Situation 
Development  
IO cell identifies planning 
information requirements as 
situation develops.  
Tasking to gather/obtain required information.  
PHASE II  Crisis 
Assessment  
IO cell identifies information 
requirements needed for mission 
planning. IO cell assists in 
development of combatant 
commander's IO planning 
guidance to support overall 
operational planning guidance.  
IO planning guidance. Initial liaison with units and agencies 
that may participate in or support IO operations.  
PHASE III  Course of Action 
Development  
IO cell supports the development 
of intelligence, operations, and 
communications staff estimates.  
IO portion of staff estimates.  
PHASE IV  Course of Action 
Selection  
IO cell assists in transforming 
staff estimates into the 
Commander's Estimate. IO cell 
assists in the IO aspect of 
Combatant Commander's 
Concept as required.  
IO portion of overall plan approved through CJCS.  
PHASE V  Execution 
Planning  
IO cell develops the complete IO 
plan and the plans for each of the 
IO elements in coordination with 
appropriate staff sections, 
operational units, and supporting 
agencies.  
Approved offensive and defensive appendices with 
element tabs, completed supporting plans, and inclusion of 
IO requirements in TPFDD.  
PHASE VI  Execution  IO cell monitors IO operations 
and adapts IO objectives to 
support changing operational 
directives.  
IO objectives modified as necessary to support changing 







Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Information Operations  
Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data  
TABLE 3.   IO CRISIS PLANNING PROCESS78 
 
Important to note from both Tables 3 and 4 is the CJCS 
requirement for approval through the CJCS for IO missions.  
The inclusion of this step, while necessary, significantly 
increases the time required to gain approval for an IO 
plan.  
                     
78 JP 3-13., V-7. 
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 INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING  
RELATED TO DELIBERATE PLANNING  
PLANNING  
PHASE  JOPES  IO CELL PLANNING ACTION  IO PLANNING OUTCOME  
PHASE I  Initiation  Notify IO cell members of planning  requirements.  N/A  
PHASE II  Concept  Development  
  
Step 1  Mission  Analysis  
IO cell identifies information requirements 
needed for mission planning.  Tasking to gather/obtain required information.  
Step 2  Planning  Guidance  
IO cell assists in development of  
combatant commander's IO planning  
guidance to support overall operational 
planning guidance.  
Combatant commander's planning guidance for 
IO.  
Step 3  Staff Estimates  
IO cell supports the development of  
intelligence, operations, and 
communications staff estimates.  
IO portion of staff estimates.  
Step 4  Commander's  Estimate  
IO cell assists in transforming staff  
estimates into the Commander's  
Estimate.  
IO portion of Commander's  
Estimate.  




IO cell assists in the IO aspect of 
Combatant Commander's Concept as 
required.  
IO portion of Combatant  
Commander's Concept.  
Step 6  CJCS Concept  Review  
IO cell assists in the IO aspect of  
CJCS Concept Review as required.  
IO portion of operational concept approved by 
CJCS.  
PHASE III  Plan  Development  
IO cell develops the complete IO  
plan and the plans for each of the IO  
elements in coordination with appropriate 
staff sections, operational units, and 
supporting agencies.  
Draft offensive and defensive IO appendices with 
element tabs.  
PHASE IV  Plan Review  IO cell modifies / refines plan as necessary. Approved offensive and defensive IO appendices.  
PHASE V  Supporting  Plans  
Subordinate units and supporting agencies 
prepare their own IO plans.  IO cell 
coordinates/assists subordinate and 
supporting IO plan as necessary. Ensure 
TPFDD supports IO plan.  
Completed subordinate and supporting agencies' 
supporting plans. IO plan supported by  
TPFDD.  
CJCS  = Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
IO  = Information Operations  
TPFDD  = Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data  
TABLE 4.   IO DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS79 
 
F. JOINT PSYOP APPROVAL PROCESS 
Similar to the Joint IO approval process, the Joint 
PSYOP approval process is complex and time consuming as 
well. Figure 17 shows the process for getting a PSYOP 
                     
79 JP 3-13. V-8. 
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program approved, while Figure 18 shows all the steps 
necessary to approve a product for an approved PSYOP 
program.  
 
FIGURE 17. PROCESS TO GAIN APPROVAL FOR A JOINT PSYOP 
PROGRAM80 
                     
80 JP3-53., V-4. 
 50
 
FIGURE 18. PROCESS TO GAIN APPROVAL FOR PRODUCTS TO BE 
PRODUCED FOR AN APPROVED PSYOP PROGRAM81 
 
 
G. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISED IO DOCTRINE 
While current IO doctrine does include pre-planned and 
pre-approved IO missions as part of Operational Plans 
(OPLANS), these annexes must be detailed enough to include 
pre-approval and possible production of material (leaflets 
and taped radio and TV broadcasts) that may be used through 
all phases of the conflict.  In addition to having detailed 
IO missions and material approved prior to hostilities, 
there must be a revision in IO doctrine to allow the 
flexibility to make quick adjustments to the overall 
mission as unexpected events occur or as the situation 
                     
81 JP 3-53., V-5. 
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changes.  This concept of doctrine providing flexibility is 
not a revolutionary concept.  
In this post September 11, 2001 society there has been 
several changes made in the military and government 
agencies where greater authority has been given to 
commanders in order reduce time consuming approval chains.  
One such example is that of an “execute order” that the 
Washington Post wrote about in a February 2005 article 
“Pentagon Seeking Leeway Overseas: Operations Could Bypass 
Envoys”.  According to the article, the Pentagon is seeking 
the authority to place Special Forces into countries with 
out the approval of the countries ambassador, thus reducing 
the time required to launch counterterrorism missions.82  
The IO community should embrace this concept of reducing 
the approval process and revise their doctrine so that the 
U.S. can quickly respond to world events.   
                     
82 Ann Scott Tyson and Dana Priest, “Pentagon Seeking Leeway 
Overseas: Operations Could Bypass Envoys,” Washington Post, 24 February 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Master the mechanics and techniques; understand 
the art and profession; and be smart enough to 
know when to deviate from it. 
GEN Zinni, CENTCOM 
 
A. TRUE TRANSFORMATION 
According to direction in Transformation: A Strategic 
Approach, the four Military Transformation Pillars 
identified by the Secretary of Defense include 
strengthening joint operations, exploiting U.S. 
intelligence advances, concept development and 
experimentation, and developing transformational 
capabilities (Figure 19).   
 
FIGURE 19. FOUR PILLARS OF MILITARY TRANSFORMATION83 
 
                     
83 Director, Force Transformation. Transformation a strategic 
approach (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 20. 
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As mentioned in Chapter II, the concept to produce the LCS 
that was agreed to by congress was that the LCS would be a 
transformational platform.  While the current configuration 
does meet the criteria to be classified transformational, 
as of September 2004, while conducting research for this 
thesis there had been no attention paid to the use of the 
LCS in IO missions.  The inclusion of an IO module with the 
joint manning outlined in Chapter III, would provide 
further justification for continued funding and development 
of the LCS class.  The technology required to develop an IO 
module is currently being employed in other areas; as such 
the cost to develop the module would be minimal.  As 
discussed in Chapter  III, an IO module on the LCS would 
provide enormous benefits to the joint force commander and 
the IO mission as well as providing advantages no other 
platform currently does.   
As of February 2005, there appeared to be progress in 
the development of IO capabilities for the LCS.  There is a 
draft LCS concept of operations (CONOPS) being circulated 
that does provide hope for the inclusion of IO in the 
development of the LCS.  This draft CONOPS is being 
developed through collaboration between the following DoD 
organizations: Commander Fleet Forces Command, Commander 
Naval Surface Forces Pacific, Commander Naval Surface 
Forces Atlantic; Chief of Naval Operations N61, N75, N76, 
N77, N78; Commander Mine Warfare Command; Commander 
Undersea Surveillance; Network Warfare Command; Navy 
Warfare Development Command; Fleet Information Warfare 
Command; Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships; PEO Littoral 
and Mine Warfare; PEO (C4I), PEO Integrated Warfare 
Systems; Naval Sea Systems Command 03 and 06; Naval Air 
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Systems Command; Naval Special Warfare Command; PMS 501; 
Surface Warfare Development Group; Fleet Collaborative Team 
and the Mission Systems and Ship Integration Team.84 
According to this collaborative draft CONOP, “LCS has core 
and focused mission systems that provide some ISR/IO 
capability, however, a separate ISR mission package can 
provide additional ISR capabilities.”85  In section 6.4.4.1 
the draft CONOP goes on to say: 
LCS will conduct IO as an inherent mission 
capability. IO missions appropriate for LCS 
include Influence Operations, Communications 
Electronic Attack (EA) and Computer Network 
Operations. For precursor operations, the ISR/IO 
mission package is envisioned for use in IPB. The 
IO mission will take advantage of the capability 
of LCS networking to perform distributed 
computing and time critical coordination of 
assets using core LCS workstations that can be 
easily configured for the IO mission. LCS is part 
of the federated process of sensor analysis. 
Previous ISR sensor data discussion in this 
section is germane to the IO mission. If analysis 
or processing of sensor data is not required on 
LCS, then a SCI facility may not be required.  
Influence Operations: As part of the ISR/IO 
inherent mission capability, LCS may have mobile 
broadcast capabilities. LCS may also be the 
conduit for limited-production and robust 
dissemination of influence products, including 
the receipt of audio, video and images for turn 
around into radio broadcasts.  
Communications EA: LCS will be able to engage a 
specified range of non-kinetic targets in the 
littoral, independently or cooperatively (with 
other LCS or other platforms). This includes the 
use of core communications systems and antennas 
                     
84 “Collaborative Draft LCS CONOP” (working paper of government LCS 
design team, August 2004). VIII-IX. 
85 Ibid., 35. 
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in Electronic Support (ES) and as a time-
difference of arrival node for ES, EA and geo-
location of emitters. The preferred employment is 
dual use of LCS communications systems for both 
connectivity and ES/EA missions; however, a 
mobile cryptologic sensor package will be 
available for expanded ES tasking. As an ES/EA
node, LCS will be part of a larger Joint 
targeting process that incorporates integrated 
kinetic and non-kinetic target engagement. EA 
tasking may include support for time critical 
targeting.86 
It appears that if this draft CONOP does become the 
official guidance for the LCS, the sea frame will have IO 
assets as well as IO module.  If this draft CONOP is made 
into doctrine and used for the development the LCS may 
avoid the ill fate of the Wampanoag and avoid the difficult 
adjustment process the B-17 had to go through as discussed 
in Chapter  V. 
 Unlike the LCS, throughout the writing of this thesis 
SPARTAN SCOUT development and discussions have not 
addressed the integration of IO tools.   However, as 
mentioned in Chapter  II there is competition in USV 
development within the Navy.  Unlike the competition 
between General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin for the future 
of LCS where the modules for each companies LCS must be 
interchangeable, there are no such restrictions between 
ONR’s USSV and NUWC’s SPARTAN SCOUT.  If NUWC were first to 
develop an IO module for their SPARTAN SCOUT it would only 
provide further justification for continued funding and 
development.   
 
                      
86 “Collaborative Draft LCS CONOP”, 37-38. 
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B. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH  
If this draft CONOP is accepted as doctrine, it 
appears the LCS is moving in the right direction with 
regards to IO.  The SPARTAN SCOUT should embrace the 
development of an IO module out of self preservation.  The 
one area that requires further research is that of 
doctrine.  After September 11, 2001, there have been 
numerous task forces assigned to conduct reviews over the 
various U.S. intelligence communities.  Several of these 
task force recommendations have all ready been addressed 
throughout this thesis. However, one area of further 
research that should be explored is provided by the DSB 
taskforce on Strategic Communications.  According to the 
task force: 
We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure 
that all military plans and operations have 
appropriate strategic communication components, 
ensure collaboration with the Department of 
State’s diplomatic missions and with theater 
security cooperation plans; and extend U.S. 
STRATCOM’s and U.S. SOCOM’s Information 
Operations responsibilities to include DoD 
support for public diplomacy. The Department 
should triple current resources (personnel & 
funding) available to combatant commanders for 
DoD support to public diplomacy and reallocate 
Information Operations funding within U.S. 
STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic 
communication programs.87 
This recommendation to change IO doctrine to include closer 
collaboration with the Department of State and the support 
of public diplomacy could further complicate and delay the 
approval process for IO related materials.  A concern with 
                     
87 Solt, “Strategic Communications,” 9. 
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this DSB task force recommendation is that the suggestion 
for collaboration with the Department of State may evolve 
into a requirement for State Department approval or 
concurrence for all IO missions.  While it is important for 
the correct message to be conveyed on the battle field as 
discussed in Chapter  V, in order for an influence campaign 
to be effective in this fast paced global society the U.S. 
must act fast and ideally be first to get their message out 
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